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This contribution examines the various international instru-
ments, in both hard and soft law, that have been estab-
lished by international organisations such as the WTO and
WCO and scrutinises how they have been implemented into
EU legislation governing the EU Customs Union, thus dem-
onstrating the substantial influence of international instru-
ments on the Customs Union. As the relevant international
instruments affect not only the traditional elements of Euro-
pean customs law, but also the EU’s entire export control
regime and the framework of the internal market, this con-
tribution demonstrates, moreover, how the Customs Union
functions in a globalised world.
Keywords: European Union, customs union, international
law, customs legislation, autonomous standards
1 Introduction
The year 2018 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the
establishment of the EU Customs Union (‘the Customs
Union’). Whereas its fortieth anniversary was seen as an
occasion worthy of celebrating,1 no such celebrations
have been organised to mark the more remarkable event
that the Customs Union has now been in operation for
half a century. The main reason for the absence of cele-
brations is the decision by the United Kingdom to leave
the Customs Union. This has raised questions about the
role of the Customs Union in the future relationship
between the EU and the United Kingdom.2 Although
the primary effect of this situation may be of an eco-
nomic nature, we should not forget that the Customs
Union has historically also been valued as a ‘tool for
peace’.3 The fiftieth anniversary can therefore be seen as
a good opportunity to analyse international law’s impact
on the continuing development of the Customs Union,
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1. See the special events organised to mark the Customs Union’s fortieth
anniversary, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/
40customs/index_en.htm (archived; last visited 11 October 2018) and
European Parliament resolution, document P6_TA(2008)0305 (no
equivalent for the more recent anniversary).
2. T. Lyons, ‘Commentary: Customs Union: EU Foundation Stone, Brexit
Stumbling Stone’, 12(9) Global Trade and Customs Journal 344, at
346-47 (2017).
3. Ibid., at 344-45.
as well as to demonstrate international law’s strong
impact on legislation governing the Customs Union.
Article 28 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU) stipulates that the Union ‘shall
comprise a customs union which shall cover all trade in
goods’. The Union Customs Code (UCC),4 by contrast,
which was enacted to manage this Customs Union,
sticks to the traditional wording that ‘the Union is based
upon a customs union’,5 which demonstrates its funda-
mental role for the EU even more clearly. The develop-
ment of the EU into the form we know today has always
been deeply interrelated with the Customs Union, as
manifested by Article 28 TFEU. The central piece of
European customs legislation is now the UCC, which
was enacted in 2013 and which, like the Customs Union
itself, has evolved over time. The establishing of the lat-
ter on 1 July 1968, ahead of schedule, was considered
simply as a starting point for a long series of additional
steps,6 with the European Commission admitting in
1982 that a fully developed customs union was still a
long way off.7 Even today, the Customs Union has still
not been completed8 and continues to constitute a seem-
ingly never-ending process of adapting to the ever-
changing challenges of world trade. And while the
UCC9 was enacted with the aim of modernising the
Customs Union’s legal framework,10 the European
Commission, for example, still sees the need for the
independent customs administrations in the member
states to continue working towards acting as a single
entity.11 Meanwhile the Commission’s proposal for a
directive on the Union’s legal framework for customs
infringements and sanctions12 is still pending, while a
customs union without harmonised sanctions is deemed
to be incomplete.13
As early as 1966, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
found the provisions governing the Customs Union to
be of fundamental importance for establishing the free
4. EP and Council Regulation 952/2013, OJ 2013 L 269/1.
5. Lyons, above n. 2, at 345.
6. T. Lyons, EU Customs Law – 3rd edition (2018), at 33.
7. European Commission Programme for the Attainment of the Customs
Union, 12 February 1982, COM(82) 50 final, at 3.
8. Lyons, above n. 2, at 346.
9. EP and Council Regulation 952/2013, OJ 2013 L 269/1.
10. On the various reasons for reforming customs law, see H.M. Wolffgang
and K. Harden, ‘The New European Customs Law’, 10(1) World Cus-
toms Journal 3, at 3-4 (2016).
11. European Commission Communication COM(2016) 813 final, at 4.
12. EP and Council Directive Proposal COM(2013) 884 final.
13. T. Lyons, ‘A Customs Union without Harmonized Sanctions: Time for
Change?’ 10 GTCJ 136-42 (2015).
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movement of goods.14 The prohibition on customs
duties and charges having equivalent effect was
designed to combat the obstacles to trade, created by
such duties, between member states.15 While the ban on
such duties and charges relates to the internal dimension
of the single market, the Common Customs Tariff
(CCT) governs trade with third countries or, in other
words, the external dimension of the single market. The
establishment of the CCT in 1968 was intended to ach-
ieve equalisation of customs duties and charges levied
on products imported from third countries at the exter-
nal borders of what was then the European Community
so as to avoid deflecting trade with third countries and
distorting free circulation and competitive conditions in
the internal market.16 The Customs Union undoubtedly
plays an indispensable role in virtually all the EU’s
other integration projects as the single market would be
inconceivable without the Customs Union at its founda-
tions.
But even though legislation governing the Customs
Union is in the hands of the EU, the European legislator
has to take numerous international instruments govern-
ing international trade into consideration, and these
instruments will be evaluated in this context. On the
one hand, EU customs and foreign trade law have been
shaped primarily by the provisions of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), in particular the General Agree-
ment on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 1994, while the
Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) is also of particu-
lar relevance when it comes to trade facilitation and the
growing recognition of this in the legislative procedure.
On the other hand, the EU also has to take account of
the World Customs Organization (WCO) with regard to
the customs-specific provisions introduced through the
Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC), adopted in 2006,
and the SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and
Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE Framework), adopted in
2005.
The status of these international legal instruments dif-
fers according to whether they constitute hard law or
soft law, and this status, in turn, affects the formation of
the relevant EU legislation. With the exception of
GATT 1994, all regulations are considered, to a certain
extent, to be at least partially of a soft-law nature.
Introducing soft-law rather than hard-law regulations –
with the former generally being seen as offering greater
flexibility for non-state actors and lower contracting
costs – has been indicated as being especially beneficial
for facilitating trade.17
14. Cases 52 and 55/65, Germany v. Commission, [1966] ECR 00159, at
169; Case 115/02, Rioglass und Transremar, [2003] ECR I-12 705, at
18.
15. Cases 2 and 3/69, Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders/Brachfeld
and Chougol, [1969] ECR 00211, at 15, 18.
16. Cases 37 and 38/73, Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders/India-
mex, [1973] ECR 01609, at 8-9; Case C-126/94, Cadi Surgelés and
Others, [1996] ECR I-5647, at 14; Case C-173/05, Commission v. Italy,
[2007], ECR I-4917, at 29.
17. H.M. Wolffgang and E. Kafeero, ‘Old Wine in New Skins: Analysis of
the Trade Facilitation Agreement vis-à-vis the Revised Kyoto Conven-
tion’, 8(2) World Customs Journal 27, at 34 (2014); K. Abbott and
2 EU Competences in the Field
of the Customs Union
Article 3(1)(a) TFEU defines the Customs Union as
being an exclusive competence of the EU, while Article
3(1)(e) TFEU states that the EU also has exclusive com-
petence in respect of a common commercial policy
(CCP). Article 3(2) TFEU states that the Union addi-
tionally has ‘exclusive competence for the conclusion of
an international agreement when its conclusion is pro-
vided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary
to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence.’
According to Article 2(1) TFEU, exclusive competence
means that ‘only the Union may legislate and adopt
legally binding acts,’ while EU member states must
refrain from doing so unless ‘they are empowered by the
Union or for the implementation of Union acts.’ Given
that domestic legislation is assigned merely a supple-
mentary role in customs matters18 and given the
requirement for this legislation to be in accordance with
EU law, there is no need here to assess national customs
provisions in any further detail.
Owing, however, to the principle of conferred powers,
the EU may act only if it has been granted a legal basis
for action in the treaties pursuant to Article 5(2) of the
Treaty on European Union. The listing in Article 3
TFEU of the areas in which the EU has exclusive com-
petence does not serve as a legal basis for enacting legal
instruments. And despite customs legislation constitut-
ing a fundamental part of any customs union, the
TFEU does not provide an express competence to adopt
customs law.19 This gap has been filled by the adopting
of the UCC, particularly with regard to Article 33 (cus-
toms cooperation), Article 114 (approximations of laws
for the establishment and functioning of the internal
market) and Article 207 (CCP) TFEU. Article 207
TFEU clarifies that the Union’s exclusive competence
in the field of the CCP extends both to autonomous
measures and to the concluding of agreements (external
competence), and including the implementation of these
agreements (internal competence).
3 The EU Customs Union in a
Globalised World
To understand the concepts in international law and the
latter’s role with regard to the EU Customs Union, it is
helpful to shed some light on the requirements for
establishing international standards in the fields of cus-
toms and public international trade law in a globalised
world. Traders obviously face considerable barriers to
D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, 54(3) Inter-
national Organization 421, at 434 (2000).
18. S. Armella, EU Customs Code (2017), at 31.
19. M. Lux, ‘EU Customs Law and International Law’, 1(1) World Customs
Journal 19, at 21 (2007).
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trade if they have to deal with wide-ranging provisions
and procedures that vary from one country or territory
to the next. Not surprisingly, therefore, states were
quick to appreciate the need to harmonise international
trade rules in order to facilitate cross-border trade of
goods. The origins of the international community’s
long-standing common interest in customs law can be
seen as dating back to the Convention Concerning the
Formation of an International Union for the Publication
of Customs Tariffs, signed in 1890.20 Some two decades
later, in 1923, the League of Nations hosted a confer-
ence that resulted in the signing of the International
Convention relating to the Simplification of Customs
Formalities.21
Surprisingly, then, it was not until its Ministerial Con-
ference in Singapore in 1996 that the WTO added
‘trade facilitation’ to its agenda.22 This was despite glob-
al rules for customs valuation, leading to a high degree
of uniformity in assessing the customs value of imported
goods, being adopted under the auspices of GATT
1947, which can be seen as a predecessor of the WTO.
However, we have to keep in mind that the core idea for
this model was not to facilitate trade, but rather to pre-
vent the parties that had ratified GATT from under-
mining their distinct commitments to customs duties by
using arbitrary customs valuation methods.23
Nowadays, trade facilitation is seen as comprising ‘the
simplification, harmonisation, standardisation and mod-
ernisation of trade procedures’ in order to reduce trade
transaction costs at the interface between business and
government.24 Harmonisation is defined as ‘the align-
ment of national formalities, procedures, operations and
documents with international conventions, standards
and practices’, whereas standardisation has been descri-
bed as ‘the process of developing internationally agreed
formats for practices and procedures, documents and
information’.25 Trade facilitation is a genuinely interdis-
ciplinary challenge since it is simultaneously a political,
economic, business, administrative, technical and tech-
nological issue.26
The core drivers of trade facilitation are the WTO and
the WCO. Numerous international conventions and
instruments have been established, especially under the
auspices of the WCO, with the aim of eliminating trade
barriers in the field of customs legislation. These
include the International Convention on the Harmon-
ized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS
Convention), the Revised International Convention on
20. 26 Stat. 1518, Treaty Series 384; see Lyons, above n. 6, at 19.
21. League of Nations, Treaty Series, Volume 30, at 373.
22. T. Butterly, ‘Trade Facilitation in a Global Trade Environment’, in
C. Cosgrove-Sacks and A. Apostolov (eds.), Trade Facilitation: The
Challenges for Growth and Development (2003) 29, at 35.
23. T. Einhorn, ‘Customs Law, International’, encyclopaedia entry, MPEPIL,
at 28 (2014).
24. A. Grainger, ‘Customs and Trade Facilitation: From Concepts to Imple-
mentation’, 2(1) World Customs Journal 17, at 20 (2008); see also
WTO, World Trade Report 2015, at 36.
25. UN/CEFACT Recommendation No. 33 on Single Windows of 2005;
Grainger, above n. 24, at 20.
26. Butterly, above n. 22, at 32.
the Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs Pro-
cedures (the Revised Kyoto Convention, or RKC),27 the
SAFE Framework and the Framework of Standards on
Cross-border E-Commerce.28 In terms, however, of
trade facilitation, the WTO’s TFA, which entered into
force in 2017, must also be highlighted, even though it
contains almost exclusively elements derived from the
RKC, but transposes them into hard law.29 Most of the
commitments in the TFA were consequently already
part of the EU customs regulatory framework under the
Community Customs Code (CCC, 1992) and were fur-
ther developed under the UCC in 2013.30
As the EU has also adopted all the relevant international
instruments31 requiring it to transpose the customs law
governing the EU Customs Union into national or
regional customs law, this customs law has largely been
designed to implement international customs rules.
More or less the same applies to other areas of inter-
national trade law, given that the EU legislation govern-
ing the Customs Union is not restricted to customs pro-
visions and the related issue of trade facilitation. The
EU also operates the CCP, which, as an integrated part
of EU external relations, aims to achieve balanced eco-
nomic and social development worldwide through trade
liberalisation, fair trade and integration into the world
global economy.32 This has led to a remarkable number
of legislative acts in the form of export control legisla-
tion, trade defence instruments, preferential trade
arrangements and trade embargoes, all of which can be
summarised under the heading of ‘trade policy meas-
ures’.
International traders also have to cope with the chal-
lenge of crossing language barriers. The EU Customs
Union itself has twenty-four official languages,33 while
trade with third countries may also require accompany-
ing documents to be supplied in the official language of
the country of destination, which may not necessarily be
an official EU language. In order to facilitate external
trade, specific codes (such as tariff classification codes,
customs procedure codes and INCOTERMS) rather
than words have been adopted. In this respect, EU cus-
toms legislation governing the Customs Union also
reflects the international efforts to achieve standardisa-
tion.
27. For conventions and agreements sponsored or administered by the
WCO, see http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/legal-instruments/
conventions.aspx.
28. For resolutions of the WCO, see http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-
us/legal-instruments/resolutions.aspx.
29. Wolffgang and Kafeero, above n. 17, at 35.
30. T. Cachet, ‘The World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agree-
ment: Legal Consequences and Impact on the Union Customs Code’,
12(2) Global Trade and Customs Journal 74 (2017).
31. For the extent of their scope, see Lux, above n. 19, at 21 ff.
32. A. Dimopoulos, ‘The Effect of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and
Objectives of the Common Commercial Policy’, 15(2) European Foreign
Affairs Review 153, at 170 (2010).
33. Council Regulation 1, OJ 1958 17/385, consolidated text (1 July 2013).
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Trade Law into EU
Legislation
To assess the impact of international law on the EU
Customs Union we first need to consider the methods
for transposing international law into Union law. Inter-
national law may be reflected at the level of primary EU
law (treaties) or in secondary and tertiary EU legisla-
tion.
The external dimension of the Customs Union is funda-
mentally influenced by international agreements on a
wide range of aspects governing international trade in
goods. Article 207 TFEU forms the basis of such agree-
ments with regard to commercial policy measures, while
Article 217 entitles the EU to negotiate and conclude
association agreements, such as the existing agreements
with Turkey or the Western Balkan states. The ECJ has
also held that external competence may derive from
other provisions of the TFEU and measures adopted
within the framework of those provisions. The existence
of internal rules or unexercised treaty powers (‘implied
power’) to adopt such rules may also grant external
competence to the EU.34
Once such agreements enter into force, their legal stand-
ing within the hierarchy of EU law is highly significant.
Under Article 216(2) TFEU, agreements concluded by
the Union are binding on the institutions of the Union
and on its member states. Once an agreement enters into
force, its provisions form an ‘integral part’ of EU law.35
EU agreements that enter into force are binding on the
member states by virtue of their obligations under EU
law, rather than under international law.36 The ECJ has
held that international agreements are directly effective,
providing certain conditions are fulfilled. The principle
of the direct effect of EU law, as previously acknowl-
edged by the ECJ,37 requires the provision in question
to be unconditional, its application not to be dependent
on further action by the EU or member state institu-
tions, and it to be sufficiently clearly defined.38 Whether
an agreement can be directly effective depends on the
specific agreement in question. In the case of GATT
and now WTO law, the ECJ has concluded that because
they are characterised by great flexibility, it is only
under very specific circumstances that such multilateral
agreements are capable of conferring individual rights
34. Case 22/70, Commission v. Council – European Agreement on Road
Transport, [1970] ECR 01971, at 27 and 72-77.
35. Case 181/73, Haegeman, [1974] ECR 00449, at 5; Opinion 1/91; EEA
Agreement I, [1991] ECR I-6079, at 37; Lyons, above n. 6, at 248.
36. P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law, 6th edition (2015), at 338.
37. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 0001.
38. Ibid., at II.
that can be invoked by economic operators in national
courts.39
In the Kupferberg case,40 however, the ECJ found the
earlier free trade agreement between the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) and Portugal to have direct
effect as the provision in question was unconditional
and sufficiently precise, and its direct application was
within the purpose of the agreement. As a result, the
Court declared this trade agreement to be directly
enforceable.41 This position was further strengthened in
the ECJ judgment on the legal effect of the former
Lomé IV Convention on preferential market access for
goods originating in ACP42 states, where the Court
found the Convention able to confer rights on individu-
als that they may enforce in national courts in order to
challenge the application of conflicting national provi-
sions.43 Consequently, those parts of international
agreements that are sufficiently precise are directly
applicable, without any need to adopt implementing
provisions. This applies especially to rules of origin or
tariff concessions in preferential agreements.44 The
Customs Convention on the International Transport of
Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets has also been cate-
gorised as directly applicable,45 with the result that only
some of its administrative provisions have had to be
transposed into EU customs regulations.46 This option
to integrate international agreements into EU law with-
out express transposition means that the assessment of
international law’s impact cannot be restricted to the
traditional written sources of EU law as laid down in the
treaties or as adopted under Article 288 TFEU.
In some cases, international agreements that are directly
applicable have nevertheless been transposed into EU
law, such as where the EU is the contracting party to
more than one convention on a specific subject and, for
reasons of transparency, the EU legislation has been
drafted to accommodate all these conventions’ rules. In
other cases, the EU may apply more generous rules than
those adopted under the various conventions.47
In practice, however, most international agreements are
not directly applicable and have to be expressly trans-
posed into EU legislation. This transposition can be lit-
eral, or almost literal, if the wording of the international
instrument can form the basis for the EU legislation,
with more detailed rules then being added, if necessary.
Examples of such agreements include the Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding System and the
WTO Customs Valuation Agreement.48 In the field of
export control law, non-proliferation arrangements form
39. Case C-280/93, Germany v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-4973.
40. Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG a.A.,
[1982] ECR 03641.
41. Craig and De Búrca, above n. 36, at 345.
42. African, Caribbean and Pacific.
43. Case C-469/93, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Chiquita
Italia SpA, [1995] I-4533, at 31-35.
44. Lux, above n. 19, at 21.
45. Case C-78/01, BGL v. Germany, [2003] ECR I-9543, at 43.
46. Lux, above n. 19, at 22.
47. Ibid., at 22.
48. Ibid., at 23.
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the basis for the listing of goods in Annex I of the EU
Dual-Use Regulation.49 This Regulation was adopted
on the basis of the CCP (formerly Article 133 Treaty
Establishing the European Community [TEC], now
Article 207 TFEU) as the ECJ found in Leifer50 and
Werner51 that rules governing the export control of dual-
use items also fall within this policy, which forms part of
the EU’s exclusive competence.
International law’s impact on the EU Customs Union is
intensified by the fact that EU law must be interpreted,
as far as possible, in conformity with international
agreements.52 Secondary EU legislation has to be inter-
preted in the light of the international obligations of the
EU that stem from the wide scope of international
instruments in the field of international trade. In gener-
al, it is already an obligation under international law to
make full use of EU secondary legislation when inter-
preting EU law adopted in implementation of inter-
national law. This also avoids conflicts and leads to a
harmonious and more coherent relationship between
EU law and international law.53
Remarkably, the four non-proliferation arrangements
implemented by the EU Dual-Use Regulation (i.e. the
Wassenaar Arrangement, the Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and the
Australia Group) are all of a nonbinding character since
they are merely political understandings between partic-
ipating countries rather than legally binding inter-
national agreements. By being implemented in the form
of a regulation, these commitments become directly
binding in all EU member states under Article 288
TFEU. The same mechanism applies to the SAFE
Framework, which was compiled under the auspices of
the WCO and constitutes the basis for the global intro-
duction of the Authorised Economic Operator (AEO)
instrument. This framework is likewise not a legally
binding instrument, but rather a strong recommenda-
tion to national legislators to implement the agreed
standards.
5 Essential Elements of the
Customs Union under WTO
Law
In general, a customs union means substituting a single
customs territory for two or more customs territories,
49. Council Regulation 428/2009, OJ 2009 L 134/1.
50. Case C-83/94, Criminal proceedings against Peter Leifer et al., [1995]
ECR I-3231.
51. Case C-70/94, Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH, [1995] ECR
I-3189.
52. Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, at 52;
Case C-286/02, Bellio F.lli Srl, [2004] ECR I-3465, at 33; Case
C-335/05, Řízení Letového Provozu ČR, s.p. v. Bundesamt für Finan-
zen, [2007] ECR I-4307 at 50.
53. K. Ziegler, ‘The Relationship between EU Law and International Law’, in
D. Patterson and A. Södersten (eds.), A Companion to European Union
Law and International Law (2016) 42, at 51.
eliminating almost all restrictions on internal trade and
applying substantially the same restrictions to external
trade.54 The EU has followed the ‘single customs terri-
tory’ approach by defining the single customs territory
of the Union.55
Owing to the EU’s membership of the WTO, the trade-
relevant arrangements of the EU have to be in compli-
ance with WTO rules. The Customs Union forms the
basis for the single market, while WTO law, in turn,
provides the basis for a customs union. In principle,
WTO members recognise the desirability of regional
trade agreements (RTAs), including customs unions,
providing the purpose of these agreements is to facilitate
trade between members of the customs union and not to
raise barriers to the trade of other WTO members with
the customs union (Article XXIV:4 GATT 1994).
Whereas a core objective of the multilateral trading
system is to eliminate discriminatory treatment in inter-
national trade relations,56 RTAs pursue trade liberalisa-
tion through precisely this form of discrimination since
the special preferences granted by the RTA are not
available to other WTO members. This discrimination
is made possible because WTO law provides for excep-
tions for regional integration purposes. These excep-
tions allow members to adopt and implement measures
that would otherwise be WTO-inconsistent on the
grounds, for example, that they breach the most fav-
oured nation (MFN) obligation.57 Under Article XXIV:
5 GATT 1994, RTAs establishing customs unions or
free trade areas may be justified even though they are
otherwise WTO-inconsistent, but only if they comply
with certain conditions.
Article XXIV:4 GATT 1994 sets out the goal of the
exception provided for in Article XXIV:5, whereby the
objective of signing an RTA should be to increase free-
dom of trade by developing closer integration and facili-
tating trade between the constituent territories rather
than raising barriers to the trade of other members with
such territories. Thus, the exception provided for in
Article XXIV:5 GATT 1994 is designed to maximise
the internal trade-liberalising effects of an RTA and to
minimise its external trade-restrictive effects, as out-
lined in the Understanding on the Interpretation of
Article XXIV GATT 1994.
However, Article XXIV:4 GATT 1994 does not in itself
create a separate obligation, but rather explains the pur-
pose of Article XXIV. The conditions for establishing
the availability of a defence under Article XXIV must
54. Art. XXIV:8(a), 8(a)(i) and (ii) GATT 1994; see A.D. Mitchell and
N. Lockhart, ‘Legal Requirements for PTAs under the WTO’, in S. Lester
and B. Mercurio (eds.), Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements,
Commentary and Analysis (2009) 81, at 85.
55. EP and Council Regulation 952/2013, OJ 2013 L 269/1, Art. 4; see also
the definition of ‘customs union’ in the WCO Glossary of International
Customs Terms, available at http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/
facilitation/instrument-and-tools/tools/glossary-of-international-
customs-terms.aspx.
56. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization of
15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144, Preamble, at 3.
57. Einhorn, above n. 23, at 40.
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therefore be interpreted in the light of the purpose of
RTAs as set forth in Article XXIV:4.58
There are two conditions under which Article XXIV:5
GATT 1994 may serve as a possible defence of a breach
of GATT provisions: a measure otherwise inconsistent
with GATT is justified under Article XXIV if:
– the measure is introduced upon the formation of a
customs union, a free trade area or an interim agree-
ment that meets all the requirements (emphasis added)
set out in WTO law; and
– the formation of the customs union or free trade area
would be prevented if the introduction of the meas-
ure concerned were not allowed (‘necessity test’).59
This part of Article XXIV:5 GATT 1994, laying down
the general conditions for the exception, is referred to as
the ‘chapeau’ of para. 5.
5.1 Impact on the Internal Dimension of the
Customs Union
The main impact of international instruments is seen to
be on the EU’s relationships with third countries.60
Compared to this external dimension, international
instruments’ influence on the internal relationships
between members of a customs union can be seen as rel-
atively low. The core provision in this respect is Article
XXIV:8(a)(i) GATT 1994, which requires members of a
customs union to eliminate duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce with respect to ‘substantially
all the trade between the constituent territories of the
customs union or at least with respect to substantially all
the trade in products originating in such territories’.
Obviously, the first of these two options serves to liber-
alise trade, and the founding members of the EEC opted
for a model that would not restrict the free movement of
goods to goods originating in the EEC because the com-
munity was designed to be based on the least bureau-
cratic model for internal trade.61
Under Article 28(2) TFEU, the concept of the free
movement of goods applies to all products originating in
EU member states and to third-country products that
are in free circulation in the internal market. In this
regard, free circulation is granted to products from third
countries that have complied with the specific formali-
ties pertaining to import and customs duties pursuant to
Article 29 TFEU. Products entitled to be in free circu-
lation are definitively and wholly assimilated to products
originating in any of the member states; in other words,
both types of products are included, without distinction,
in the same system of free circulation.62 Articles 28(2)
58. AB report in Turkey – Textiles of 22 October 1999, WT/DS34/AB/R, at
57.
59. Ibid., at 58.
60. Lyons, above n. 6, at 209.
61. Lyons, above n. 2, at 345. Nearly all customs unions follow this model.
An example of a customs union restricted to goods originating in mem-
ber states is the CARICOM customs union, in which the free movement
of goods is restricted to goods of community origin; see Art. 79 of the
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community
including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (2008).
62. Case 41/76, Donckerwolcke, [1976], ECR 01921, at 17, 21.
and 29 TFEU constitute a fundamental part of the cus-
toms provisions for the functioning of the EU single
market. Although the TFEU does not specify how
goods may receive the status of Union goods, this essen-
tial detail is clarified in the UCC. Through this provi-
sion, the UCC functions as a ‘gateway to the single mar-
ket’.
In order to establish a customs union, internal restric-
tions have to be eliminated for ‘substantially all the
trade’. Unfortunately, the WTO member states have
never reached agreement on how to interpret the term
‘substantially’.63 In the Turkey – Textiles case, the
Appellate Body (AB) noted that ‘substantially all the
trade’ is not the same as ‘all the trade’, and also that
‘substantially all the trade’ is considerably more than
merely ‘some of the trade’. Even if the terms of Article
XXIV(8)(a)(i) offer ‘some flexibility’ to the constituent
members of a customs union when liberalising their
internal trade, the degree of flexibility allowed is limited
by the requirement for ‘duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce’ to be ‘eliminated with respect
to substantially all’ internal trade. The EU shares the
widespread opinion that the ‘substantially all the trade’
criterion is fulfilled as soon as 90% of the trade between
the parties in an RTA is liberalised.64 Even though the
United States may take the view that all product groups
have to be covered by an RTA,65 the EU’s deep integra-
tion through its single market, covering the free move-
ment of goods, indisputably meets the need for internal
trade liberalisation required under Article XXIV
GATT 1994.66
How ‘other restrictive regulations of commerce’ subject
to internal liberalisation should be understood is not
entirely clear. Although WTO members pledged to
clarify this term during the Doha Round, no substantial
outcome has yet been achieved. However, the required
depth of integration should not be overemphasised as
federal states, such as the United States and Germany,
are able to grant at least some flexibility to their constit-
uent states and do not demand the harmonisation of all
the regulations that might affect trade. Given the high
degree of integration, including the ban on internal
regulations hindering trade (i.e. measures having equiv-
alent effect to quantitative restrictions under Article 34
TFEU), there can again be no doubt that the EU Cus-
toms Union is dealing with the other restrictive regula-
tions of commerce in a WTO-compliant way.67 Mathis
even suggests taking the EU model as an essential stand-
63. A. Parenti, ‘Accession to the World Trade Organisation: A Legal Analy-
sis’, 27(2) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 141, at 147 (2000).
64. See, e.g., European Commission (DG Trade) fact sheet on the interim
Economic Partnership Agreements of January 2009, tradoc_142188, at
3; WTO document TN/RL/W/190, submitted by the Delegation of
Japan, at 1.
65. A. Alavi, ‘Preferential Trade Agreements and the Law and Politics of
GATT Art. XXIV’, 1(1) Beijing Law Review 7, at 11 (2010).
66. Lyons, above n. 2, at 345.
67. J.H. Mathis, ‘Regional Trade Agreements and Domestic Regulation:
What Reach for “Other Restrictive Regulations of Commerce”’, in
L. Bartels and F. Ortino (eds.), Regional Trade Agreements and the
WTO Legal System (2006) 79, at 91.
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ard for establishing a customs union in general, given
that this would prevent RTAs that provide for less deep
forms of integration.68
The degree of flexibility provided under Article XXIV
GATT 1994 entitles constituent members of a customs
union to impose certain safeguard measures on imports
from other members of the customs union. The internal
trade requirement does not impose an obligation on the
constituent members to eliminate internal borders and
internal border inspections concerning value added tax,
excise taxes or prohibitions and restrictions. This
explains why the establishment of the Customs Union
was not meant to abolish the national customs and tax
frontiers within the customs territory. It was not until
1993 that the internal frontiers laid down in Article 7a
EC Treaty (now Article 26.2 TFEU) were removed.
5.2 Impact on the External Dimension of the
Customs Union
A customs union is frequently described as a more
developed free trade area, in which member countries
apply a common external tariff.69 However, Article
XXIV:8(a)(ii) GATT 1994 requires the constituent
members of a customs union to apply substantially the
same duties and other regulations of commerce to trade
with third countries. Hence, the common external trade
regime required has to cover duties and also other
regulations of commerce.
With regard to the term ‘same’, the AB in Turkey – Tex-
tiles70 found something closely approximating ‘same-
ness’ to be required by Article XXIV:8(a)(ii) GATT
1994. This does not mean that the members of a cus-
toms union are obliged to harmonise all external trade
restrictions or to adopt an identical external trade
regime, although most areas of foreign trade provisions
will move towards uniform standards. However, the
Article requires a higher degree of sameness than just
‘comparable trade regulations having similar effects’.
And although ‘sameness’ of other regulations of com-
merce does not automatically mean these regulations
have to stem from international rules, any autonomous
rules the EU applies will have to abide by international
standards that may be applicable, such as the need to
apply substantially the same external trade rules for all
members of the Customs Union.
The need to apply substantially the same duties requires
members of a customs union to adopt a common exter-
nal tariff for at least most goods. The CCT replaced the
national customs tariffs of the member states with effect
from 1 July 1968. The ECJ found this replacement to be
in accordance with Article XXIV GATT 1994.71 This
customs tariff has to comprise a nomenclature and the
rates for the individual tariff lines. Both these elements
68. Ibid., at 91.
69. P. Hilpold, ‘Regional Integration According to Art. XXIV GATT: Between
Law and Politics’, in A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum (eds.), Max
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 7 (2003) 219, at 226.
70. AB report in Turkey – Textiles of 22 October 1999, WT/DS34/AB/R, at
para. 50.
71. Case 38/75, Douaneagent der NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspec-
teur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, [1975] ECR 1439, at 14.
are significantly influenced by international rules, which
will be addressed in this context.
With no definition of the term ‘other regulations of
commerce’, it is no surprise that it is still disputed
which measures of the constituent members of a cus-
toms union are covered by this term.72 Negotiations
during the Uruguay Round to clarify whether ‘other
regulations of commerce’ comprise internal measures,
such as sales taxes and price controls, did not result in
any explicit guidance or interpretation. Moreover, the
use of the word ‘customs’ in Article XXIV:8 GATT
1994 was seen as an indication that the provision is
restricted to measures applied at borders. It would be
intrusive to oblige members of a customs union to apply
substantially the same internal measures to goods, either
limited to goods imported from third countries or even
extending to trade within the customs union.73 This
would result in sales taxes, as internal measures, being
subject to harmonisation. The panel’s approach in the
Turkey – Textiles case74 of demanding harmonisation of
all the regulatory measures that could possibly affect
trade included domestic regulations such as environ-
mental standards. However, setting nearly unattainable
standards for the establishment of customs unions
would not be helpful as this would prevent states from
pursuing regional integration.75 Hence, we should fol-
low the AB’s approach by taking Article XXIV:8(a)(ii)
GATT 1994 to mean that the members of a customs
union should be required to adopt ‘a common external
trade regime’.76 If we see the WCO’s definition of the
term ‘customs union’ as being restricted in terms of
standards for external trade to ‘a common Customs tar-
iff and a common or harmonised Customs legislation for
the application of that tariff,’77 we have to admit that
these common rules form the basis for customs law
only, but not for the full scope of foreign trade provi-
sions.
Getting sovereign states to agree on such a common
external trade regime by harmonising external trade
rules regulating trade with third countries is already
extraordinarily challenging. Imposing the additional
obligation to harmonise internal market measures would
mean there would be no automatic gain for the customs
union’s objective of maximising the trade-liberalising
effects on internal trade while minimising the restrictive
72. WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, ‘Note on the Meet-
ings of 6-7 and 10 July 1998’, WT/REG/M/18 (22 July 1998); J.A.
Crawford and S. Laird, ‘Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO’,
CREDIT Research Paper 2000 No. 00/3, at 12; Mitchell and Lockhart,
above n. 54, at 105.
73. Mitchell and Lockhart, above n. 54, at 105.
74. Panel report in Turkey – Textiles of 31 May 1999, WT/DS34/R, at
9.120.
75. J.H. Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO – Art. XXIV
and the Internal Trade Requirement (2002), at 251; Mathis, above n.
67, at 91.
76. AB report in Turkey – Textiles of 22 October 1999, WT/DS34/AB/R, at
49.
77. Definition of ‘customs union’ in the WCO Glossary of International
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effects on other WTO members.78 The scope of the
term ‘other regulations of commerce’ should therefore
be restricted to border measures for goods imported
from (or exported to) third countries. Even if the exact
scope of ‘other regulations of commerce’ remains
unclear, the term would clearly seem not to be congru-
ent with the term ‘other restrictive regulations of com-
merce’, as discussed with regard to the internal dimen-
sion of a customs union.79
But even if the term ‘other regulations of commerce’ is
interpreted narrowly, it will nevertheless include all
administrative rules regulating importation, quantitative
restrictions and import prohibitions, rules of origin and
safeguard measures.80 We can conclude, therefore, that
customs law comprises a need for harmonisation, but
that the EU’s Customs Union is not just about cus-
toms.81
The fact that the EU established a single market rather
than just a customs union has even increased the eco-
nomic pressure to harmonise the external trade regime.
It was the single market that led to the removal of the
internal frontiers between member states of the Cus-
toms Union. Internal border controls could be used to
allow different VAT rates and market access provisions
(such as prohibitions and restrictions) in the individual
member states. However, non-harmonised regulations
would then automatically lead to trade deflection since
products imported from a third country and released for
free circulation could then circulate freely within the
Customs Union territory. While the provisions of inter-
national law evaluated below primarily address and refer
to legislation in relation to customs and external trade
matters, the extent to which they also affect the internal
market should not be underestimated. This reflects the
deep-rooted relationship between the single market and
the Customs Union, which is here described only super-
ficially.
Article XXIV:5(a) GATT 1994 also implies that duties
and other regulations of commerce, applicable after the
formation of a customs union, must not be higher in
total or more restrictive than the general incidence of
the duties and other regulations of commerce applicable
before the customs union was created. This comparison
of the general incidence should be based on an overall
assessment of weighted average tariff rates and customs
duties collected.82 Fifty years after the EU Customs
Union was formed, this requirement is no longer an
issue. However, this specific provision still has to be
taken into consideration with regard to any potential
enlargement of the EU since an acceding nation may
have to increase its import duties when switching from
its former national tariff to the EU’s common external
tariff.
78. Mitchell and Lockhart, above n. 54, at 105.
79. Mathis (2002), above n. 75, at 252-53.
80. Mitchell and Lockhart, above n. 54, at 104.
81. Lyons, above n. 2, at 348-49.
82. WTO, Para. 2 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Art. XXIV
GATT.
If a constituent member of a newly formed customs
union has to increase a bound duty, Article XXIV:6
GATT 1994 requires the procedure for modification of
schedules (Article XXVIII GATT 1994) to be applied,
with the objective of achieving a mutually satisfactory
compensatory adjustment.83 Here, the reduction already
afforded in the corresponding duty of other constituent
members of the customs union will be taken into
account.
5.3 Scope of Measures Covered by the Exception
under Article XXIV GATT 1994
Article XXIV GATT 1994 contains conditions that
have to be complied with by members of a customs
union. In turn, it grants authorisation to deviate from
obligations under world trade law. In Turkey – Textiles,
the AB stated that the words ‘shall not prevent’ in Arti-
cle XXIV:5 mean that ‘the provisions of the GATT
1994 shall not make impossible the formation of a cus-
toms union.’ Thus, Article XXIV:5 provides a defence
against a claim that a customs union is inconsistent with
any provision of GATT 1994. The most common stand-
ard in which an RTA seeks an exception is the MFN
obligation under Article I:1 GATT 1994. Any customs
union automatically discriminates against WTO mem-
bers who are not a constituent member of the specific
customs union. Because Article XXIV:5 GATT 1994
applies to inconsistencies with regard to GATT 1994
itself, it is not clear whether it may justify measures
applied by a customs union that are inconsistent with
other WTO agreements on goods, such as those
annexed to GATT (e.g. the Agreement on the Applica-
tion of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade Agreement, or the Agreement on
Customs Valuation Aims). Based on the existing case
law on Article XXIV:5 GATT 1994, whether these
exceptions can be extended to provisions in these agree-
ments will depend on whether there is a close relation-
ship between the provisions and GATT 1994 and
whether the exception in Article XXIV has been
incorporated into the specific agreement.84
However, only measures adopted upon formation of a
customs union fall within the Article XXIV:5 excep-
tion.85 WTO-inconsistent measures added to the terms
of a customs union after the RTA has been established
would not be covered by the exception and may, there-
fore, be challenged by other WTO members for breach-
ing WTO commitments. Moreover, the exception is
restricted to the measures necessary for the formation of
an RTA and can be used ‘only to the extent that the for-
mation of the customs union would be prevented if the
introduction of the measures were not allowed’ (‘neces-
sity test’).86 There are good reasons for applying a
83. For the accession of Croatia to the EU, see, e.g., Council Decision
1030/2018, OJ 2018 L 185/1.
84. See AB report in Turkey – Textiles of 22 October 1999, WT/
DS34/AB/R, at 13.
85. Ibid., at 20; P. van den Bossche and W. Zdouc, The Law and Policy of
the World Trade Organization - 4th edition (2017), at 680.
86. See AB report in Turkey – Textiles of 22 October 1999, WT/
DS34/AB/R, at 46.
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necessity test to external trade restrictions only and not
to internal trade restrictions between the parties in an
RTA.
6 International Instruments
Implemented into the EU’s
External Trade Regime
As we have seen, the core task of establishing and main-
taining a customs union is to achieve a common external
trade regime. When adopting the common provisions
needed for such a regime, it is essential, therefore, to
consider the international instruments that will have to
be implemented for that purpose.
6.1 Multilateral Agreements under the WTO
Under Article II:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agree-
ment), the agreement itself and the associated legal
instruments included in Annexes 1 to 3 form the ‘Mul-
tilateral Trade Agreements’. These are integral parts of
the WTO Agreement and binding on all WTO mem-
bers. As the EU is also a member of the WTO in its own
right, the Union has to implement all trade-relevant
provisions of the WTO package when establishing a
common external trade regime. In this context, the EU
can restrict its efforts to provisions only relevant for
trade in goods, with most of these provisions being
found in Annex 1A.87 Annex 1A includes GATT 1994,
twelve agreements, six understandings and the Marra-
kesh Protocol to the GATT 1994 concerning imple-
mentation of agreed tariff reductions.88 This does not
automatically mean that other elements of WTO law
can be fully ignored when establishing a customs union,
as demonstrated by the border enforcement procedures
provided for in the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),89
which enables right holders to prevent customs authori-
ties from releasing infringing imports into free circula-
tion. The special requirements relating to border meas-
ures are contained in Section 4 of the enforcement part
of the TRIPS Agreement and have been transposed into
EU legislation by adoption of Regulation (EU) No.
608/2013.90
Numerous provisions impacting on the EU foreign
trade regime can be found in GATT 1994. I will
address those of most relevance. Article I:1 obliges
WTO members to accord automatically and uncondi-
tionally to all WTO members any trade advantage they
have granted to another nation (MFN principle). It thus
prohibits treating some WTO members more preferen-
87. See P.C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods, 2nd edition (2012), at 46.
88. Ibid., at 49.
89. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of
15 April 1994, in Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197.
90. EP and Council Regulation 608/2013, OJ 2013 L 181/15.
tially than others. This ban on discrimination covers
customs duties imposed on or in connection with
importation and exportation, rules and formalities
applying to importation and exportation (especially cus-
toms provisions and procedures), and specific internal
measures.91 This means equivalent import duties have
to be applied to goods originating in WTO member
states. The duties arising from the EU customs tariff
apply, for all parties, to all imports to which no specific
duty rules (trade preferences) apply.
Article V GATT 1994 provides for freedom of transit.
Goods moved in transit will be exempt from customs
duties and from all transit duties or other charges
imposed in respect to transit, except specific transporta-
tion or service charges. Furthermore, they will not be
subject to any unnecessary delays or restrictions.92 The
EU has implemented this provision through Articles
226 to 232 UCC, thus allowing non-Union goods to
move from one point to another within the customs ter-
ritory of the Union without being subject to import
duties or other charges.
Article VIII GATT 1994 allows WTO members to levy
fees and charges for services rendered on or in connec-
tion with importation and exportation, but any such fees
and charges must be limited in amount to the approxi-
mate cost of the services rendered (Article VIII:1).
Under Article 52 UCC, customs authorities managing
the EU Customs Union must not impose charges for the
performance of customs controls or any other applica-
tion of the customs legislation during the official open-
ing hours of their competent customs offices. Only in
specified cases may customs authorities levy fees. As the
limitation provision of Article VIII:1 GATT 1994 has
not been transposed into the UCC, it must be found in
national law.
Article X:3(a) GATT 1994 imposes the obligation to
administer all trade-relevant provisions in a ‘uniform,
reasonable, and impartial’ manner. The United States
challenged the management of the EU Customs Union
in the EC – Selected Customs Matters case.93 Here, the
panel held that the EU was violating Article X:3(a)
GATT 1994 because identical products within its sov-
ereignty were subject to different treatment by the vari-
ous customs administrations of the EU member states
(the fact, for example, that LCD monitors were classi-
fied under different tariff headings resulted in import
duty of 14% in one member state and 0% in the other).
In this and other scenarios,94 the panel held that the EU
was in violation of Article X:3(a) GATT 1994,95 while
finding that the term ‘uniform’ also covers geographic
uniformity and, additionally, that granting different
91. Mavroidis, above n. 87, at 135.
92. Van den Bossche and Zdouc, above n. 85, at 512.
93. WT/DS315.
94. See D. Rovetta and M. Lux, ‘The US Challenge to the EC Customs
Union’, 2(5) Global Trade and Customs Journal 195 (2007).
95. Panel report in EC – Selected Customs Matters of 16 June 2006, WT/
DS315/R, at 7.305.
241
Achim Rogmann doi: 10.5553/ELR.000126 - ELR 2019 | No. 3
treatment to identical products within its sovereignty
violated Article X GATT 1994.96
This obligation under international law creates a specific
challenge for the EU Customs Union, given that it is
decentrally administered by twenty-eight national cus-
toms administrations and that the EU does not have a
right to issue instructions to member states’ customs
administrations,97 even though member states are
obliged to ensure the thorough, uniform and effective
application and enforcement of EU law.98 However, the
fact that EU customs law is administered by national
customs authorities does not in itself lead to a breach of
Article X:3(a) GATT.99
Nevertheless, WTO members have to provide for pro-
cedures, mechanisms and institutions to prevent diver-
gences in customs administrations and to remove diver-
gences if they occur.100 Article 197(1) TFEU legitimates
the establishment of regulations to ensure the uniform
implementation of EU law, while Article 291(2) TFEU
recognises that a uniform implementation of legally
binding Union acts can justify conferring implementing
powers on the Commission.101 In recent years, the EU
has intensified its efforts to enhance uniform adminis-
tration of customs law,102 especially the enacting of the
UCC aims, in line with today’s need to offer greater
legal certainty and uniformity for the benefit of busi-
nesses and customs administrations alike.103 However,
the Commission’s still pending proposal for a directive
on the Union legal framework for customs infringe-
ments and sanctions in this context is a suitable example
of the need to further implement the requirements laid
down in international law, including Article X:3(a)
GATT, as the risk of exploitation by noncompliant
business parties in this situation constitutes a clear dis-
tortion of the internal market.104
Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement includes twelve
agreements that impact on the EU Customs Union at
varying levels (anti-dumping, agriculture, textiles and
clothing, customs valuation, import licensing, pre-ship-
ment inspections, rules of origin, subsidies and counter-
vailing measures, safeguards, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, technical barriers to trade, and trade-related
96. Panel report in EC – Selected Customs Matters of 16 June 2006, WT/
DS315/R, at 7.135; Mavroidis, above n. 87, at 829.
97. For the role, competences and strategies of the European Commission,
see K. Limbach, Uniformity of Customs Administration in the European
Union (2015), at 199 ff.
98. Case C-486/12, Gerechtshof te ’s-Hertogenbosch v. Netherlands,
[2013] ECR I-0, at 19; Case C-508/12, Vapenik, [2014] ECR I-0, at 23.
99. Panel report in EC – Selected Customs Matters of 16 June 2006, WT/
DS315/R, at 7.141; Limbach, above n. 97, at 52.
100. Panel Report in EC – Selected Customs Matters of 16 June 2006, WT/
DS315/R, at 7.144; Rovetta and Lux, above n. 94, at 207; Limbach,
above n. 97, at 51-52.
101. J.M. Grave, ‘The Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on Customs Matters: A
Legal Assessment’, 5(3) Global Trade and Customs Journal 95, at 110
(2010); Limbach, above n. 97, at 163-64.
102. With regard to tariffs, see E. Valerdi Rodriguez and E. Dulguerova,
‘Blues at the Border: The Quest for Uniform Tariff Classification in the
European Union’, 8(11/12) Global Trade and Customs Journal 368, at
375 ff. (2013).
103. Commission Report COM(2018) 39 final, at 3.
104. Lyons, above n. 13, at 142.
investment measures).105 With the exception of the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which was termi-
nated in 2005, the other agreements are still binding on
all WTO members. A new agreement was added to the
list of Annex 1A agreements in 2017. This followed the
negotiations at the 2013 Bali Ministerial Conference,
when WTO members concluded negotiations on the
TFA.106 This ultimately entered into force on 22 Febru-
ary 2017, after sufficient numbers of WTO members
had ratified a Protocol of Amendment to insert it into
Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.107
The core trade-facilitation instruments provided for
under the TFA involve the simplification, modernisa-
tion and harmonisation of export and import processes
in order to address bureaucratic burdens and ineffective
border procedures identified as significant barriers to
international trade. Accordingly, the TFA contains pro-
visions for expediting the movement, release and clear-
ance of goods by clarifying and improving the relevant
Articles (V, VIII and X GATT 1994). As one of the
parties ratifying the TFA, the EU is obliged to imple-
ment the agreement in its customs legislation. But, as
already pointed out, the UCC was enacted before the
TFA was signed, and most of the elements had already
been incorporated into EU customs legislation.108
Some of the other Annex 1A agreements have been lit-
erally, or almost literally, transposed into EU customs
legislation, thus demonstrating a high level of impact.
This applies in the case of the Agreement on Pre-Ship-
ment Inspection,109 the Customs Valuation Agree-
ment110 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement,111 as well as
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Meas-
ures112 and the Agreement on Safeguards.113 As far as
setting a framework for EU legislation is concerned, the
other Annex 1A agreements are restricted to having to
be taken into consideration in the drafting of relevant
trade rules. In these cases, the EU has transposed the
objective, rather than the exact wording, of these inter-
national instruments into EU legislation.
6.2 WCO Instruments
Most international instruments relevant for the EU
Customs Union have been drawn up under the auspices
of the WCO114 since the latter is the only international
body focusing exclusively on customs matters. The
105. Published in OJ 1994 L 336/22-189.
106. A. Grainger, ‘The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement: Consulting the
Private Sector’, 48(6) Journal of World Trade 1167, at 1167 (2014).
107. WTO General Council Protocol of 28 November 2014, WT/L/940.
108. Cachet, above n. 30.
109. Implemented by Council Regulation (EC) 3287/94, OJ 1994 L 349/79.
110. Implemented by EP and Council Regulation 952/2013, OJ 2013
L269/1, Arts. 70, 74; Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)
2015/2446, OJ 2015 L 343/1, Art. 37 No. 12; Commission Implement-
ing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447, OJ 2015 L 343/558, Recital at 26.
111. Implemented by EP and Council Regulation 2016/1036, OJ 2016 L
176/22.
112. Implemented by EP and Council Regulation 2016/1037, OJ 2016 L
176/55.
113. Implemented by EP and Council Regulation 2015/478, OJ 2015 L
83/16.
114. The official name is still the ‘Customs Cooperation Council’.
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EU’s full membership of the WCO is pending as the
necessary amendment of the relevant convention still
has to be ratified by all WCO members. To address this
issue, WCO members have adopted a decision to confer
rights ‘akin to’ membership to the EC (now EU) on an
interim basis, pending formal amendment of the con-
vention.115 WCO instruments are introduced in both
legally binding (i.e. conventions) and non-legally
binding forms (i.e. guidelines, recommendations and
practices). In the absence of a single undertaking
approach, members of the WCO are not under any obli-
gation to adopt WCO instruments.
The WCO developed and administers the Convention
on the Harmonized Commodity and Coding System
(HS). This is the global nomenclature system for goods
and is applied by more than 200 countries, territories or
economic unions.116 The EU and its member states are
parties to the HS. The core function of the HS is to
describe the goods to which a specific rate of duty is
applied.117 The list of goods contained in the Annex of
the HS Convention has been incorporated word for
word – with some additional levels of tariff lines – into
the EU’s Regulation governing the CCT.118 Owing to
its precision, the HS Convention has direct effect and,
as a result, the EU does not publish changes to the HS
in its Official Journal.119 The EU’s Combined Nomen-
clature serves both for customs purposes and as a basis
for the external trade statistics of the EU120 and other
Union policies concerning the importation and exporta-
tion of goods.121
In 1973, WCO members concluded the Kyoto Conven-
tion, which was the first global instrument aimed at sim-
plifying and harmonising customs procedures and prac-
tices.122 This was later revised and updated in the RKC
to meet government and private sector demands. The
RKC was adopted in 1999 and entered into force in
2006. The EU (and its member states) notified accession
to the RKC in March 2003.123 While it is remarkable to
see how the WCO has sought to achieve the highest
degree of harmony and uniformity in its customs sys-
tems, especially by means of the RKC,124 this uniformi-
ty obviously cannot be as extensive as the harmonisation
of the external trade regime required in a customs
union.
Even if the RKC is seen as the global standard for mod-
ern customs legislation, its awkwardly shaped structure
and the number of elements it contains that lack precise
115. T. Yamaoka, ‘The De Facto Accession of the European Communities to
the World Trade Organization: Process and Significance’, 8(4) Global
Trade and Customs Journal 92, at 97.
116. See the list of parties applying the HS, available at: http://
www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/
nomenclature/overview/hs-contracting-parties/list-of-countries/
countries_applying_hs.pdf?db=web (last visited 10 October 2018).
117. Lyons, above n. 2, at 156.
118. Council Regulation 2658/87, OJ 1987 L 256.
119. Lux, above n. 19, at 23.
120. Art. 1(1) of Council Regulation 2658/87, OJ 1987 L 256.
121. Lyons, above n. 2, at 156.
122. Armella, above n. 18, at 20.
123. Council Decision 2003/231, OJ 2003 L 86/21.
124. See considerations to the original Kyoto Convention.
provisions mean it cannot be used as a model customs
agreement.125 Furthermore, the EU has not adopted the
specific annexes included in the RKC.126 But despite
relevant parts of the RKC not being legally binding on
the EU, the UCC shows a high degree of conformity
with provisions of the RKC in some respects, even
though the terminology is not necessarily equivalent in
all cases.127 In this way, therefore, the RKC can be seen
to have a substantial impact on EU customs regulations.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Unit-
ed States was the first country to recognise terrorism as
a threat to the security of the international trade supply
chain. This encouraged the international trade com-
munity and customs administrations to develop the
SAFE Framework as a global supply chain security ini-
tiative under the auspices of the WCO. This framework
was unanimously adopted by the Directors General of
Customs, representing the members of the WCO, in
June 2005 and is one of the outcomes of the WCO’s ‘soft
approach’128 to agree on non-legally binding instru-
ments. Here, the United States used its political (and
economic) power to establish nonbinding agreements
while bypassing the established forums for collective
decision-making.129
The core element of the SAFE Framework is its intro-
duction of the legal concept of the ‘Authorised Econom-
ic Operator’ (AEO) into WCO members’ customs legis-
lation.130 Under this concept, customs authorities carry
out a detailed assessment of economic operators’ relia-
bility and can grant AEO status as a means of increasing
security in international trade while also facilitating
legitimate trade. The benefits available to AEO certifi-
cate holders in the form of simplified customs formali-
ties and improved security facilitations are intended to
enable customs controls to be carried out more precisely
and thus more effectively.
In addition to its origins in the SAFE Framework, the
AEO concept constitutes one of the elements of the
TFA. With the AEO having been integrated into the
multilateral trade rules of WTO law, an operational
AEO programme is now mandatory for all WTO mem-
bers. This is in recognition of what such a programme
can contribute to trade facilitation. Hence, the concept,
which was originally considered a soft-law instrument,
has been transformed through the TFA into a hard-law
instrument. Under Article 7 para. 7.1 TFA, each WTO
member must provide an AEO with additional trade-
facilitation measures related to import, export or transit
125. Lux, above n. 19, at 24.
126. Under Council Decision 2003/231, OJ 2003 L 86, at 7 of recital. Acces-
sion to the revised specific annexes, contained in Appendix III to the
Protocol of Amendment, will be decided at a later stage. For the struc-
ture of the RKC, see S.S. Hossain, ‘Revised Kyoto Convention: The Best
Practice Guide for Customs’, 3(11/12) Global Trade and Customs Jour-
nal 383, at 384 ff. (2008).
127. Ibid.
128. Yamaoka, above n. 115, at 94.
129. D. Holloway, 9/11 and the War on Terror (2008), at 44-45.
130. H.M. Wolffgang and J.M. Natzel, ‘The Authorized Economic Operator
in the European Union’, 2(11/12) Global Trade and Customs Journal
377, at 377 (2007).
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formalities and procedures. The criteria for qualifying
as an AEO relate to compliance, or the risk of noncom-
pliance, with requirements laid down in domestic laws,
regulations or procedures (Art. 7 para. 7.2 TFA). Thus,
the SAFE Framework, compiled and still existing as
soft law under the auspices of the WCO, has made its
way towards hard law under the WTO.
The EU implemented the WCO’s AEO model in
2008131 and has continued to apply the AEO concept
under the new UCC. In this way, it has complied with
the now binding requirement to implement a fully-
fledged AEO programme under the TFA. The AEO
concept has been described as an important, if not the
most important, development in modern European cus-
toms law. Even if adopted voluntarily, the AEO element
of customs legislation is now one of the many provisions
that has been adopted in order to comply with inter-
national obligations.
In addition to the HS and RKC, the WCO administers a
wide range of other international agreements, while the
Convention on Temporary Admission (‘Istanbul Con-
vention’),132 which is directly applicable and thus has
been only partly transposed into EU customs legisla-
tion,133 was also established under the auspices of the
WCO.
6.3 Other International Sources
Another international instrument of relevance to the EU
Customs Union is the Customs Convention on the
International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR
Carnets (‘TIR Convention’), which is administered by
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE). The EEC acceded to the TIR Convention in
1978,134 and this Convention has also been deemed to be
directly applicable.135 By contrast, the Agreement on the
Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Materials (‘Florence Agreement’) was arrived at under
the umbrella of the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). This
Agreement was adopted by the EEC in 1979136 and has
been incorporated into the latest version of the Regula-
tion governing the EU’s system of reliefs from customs
duty.137
7 Remaining Autonomy for EU
Legislation Governing the
Customs Union
This contribution has shown the wide range of inter-
national agreements impacting on legislation governing
131. Ibid., at 377.
132. See Council Decision 329/93, OJ 1993 L 130/1.
133. Lux, above n. 19, at 22.
134. Council Regulation 2112/78, OJ 1978 No. L 252/1.
135. Case C-78/01, BGL v. Germany, [2003] ECR I-9543 at 43.
136. Council Decision 79/505, OJ 1979 L134/13.
137. Council Regulation 1186/2009, OJ 2009 L 324/23.
the EU Customs Union. International law has left an
extensive footprint on the Customs Union. This, com-
bined with the EU’s implementing of certain soft-law
international instruments in the form of nonbinding
standards, shows that the EU has followed a pattern of
seeking to achieve high global standardisation of import
and export rules in order to facilitate cross-border trade.
As far as the international instruments leave gaps for
national or supranational provisions, these gaps are fil-
led in conformity with the laws adopted in order to
comply with international obligations, standards and
recommendations.
Once legal acts applying to the EU Customs Union have
been drafted, it is essential to enforce them. The need to
implement the framework of relevant international pro-
visions, stemming mostly from the WTO and WCO,
has resulted in a high degree of international harmonisa-
tion of EU legislation governing the Customs Union.
Any remaining areas have to be filled by legislation
adopted by the EU and its member states. Even though
EU customs legislation includes increasing numbers of
exhaustive rules138 and the UCC has left fewer and few-
er gaps for national legislation in comparison to earlier
regulations, customs legislation still comprises a mix of
EU and national legislation.139 The areas not influenced
by international standards comprise not only provisions
governing infringements and sanctions but also appeal
procedures, provisions on the occurrence of customs
debts and provisions relating to the collecting of cus-
toms duties. On this basis, around 90% of customs leg-
islation in the EU Customs Union is estimated to be
determined by international law and instruments.
8 Conclusion
This contribution has shown how, at its fiftieth anniver-
sary, the EU Customs Union has evolved under the
strong influence of international law. Over the years, the
provisions of various international instruments, primari-
ly deriving from the WTO and WCO, have found their
way – independent of their legal nature – into the fun-
damental customs-related principles of EU legislation.
While, internally, the EU Customs Union is designed to
abolish most trade-restricting measures between its con-
stituent members in accordance with GATT 1994,
externally it is guided by the target to harmonise all
trade-related relationships with third countries, also
under the scope of GATT 1994. And the essential ‘sin-
gle currency’ of external trade provisions has not stop-
ped at customs legislation as it also extends to wide areas
of trade-related legislation.
138. On the right to representation before the customs authorities, see Case
C-153/10, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. Sony Supply Chain
Solutions (Europe) BV, [2011] ECR I-02775, at 30; on the joint and sev-
eral liability of several debtors for the same customs debt, see Case
C-78/10, Berel and Others, [2011] ECR I-00717, at 41 ff.
139. Lyons, above n. 13, at 139.
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This process of evolution is set to continue, focusing on
the concept of trade facilitation in order to make cus-
toms procedures more economically efficient. The con-
cept of the AEO, introduced in the WCO’s SAFE
Framework and the WTO’s TFA, must surely consti-
tute a first important step in this process. However,
while the EU may seem to represent a modern-day
example of a customs union, addressing and incorporat-
ing into its legislation all the relevant provisions in
international law, its promoting of further international
harmonisation will result in its losing autonomy.
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